Abstract. The search for information in memory of technological competition process in the market is analysed using techniques widespread in biomathematics. Here we examined the effects that delayed information causes in choosing strategies process on the part of manufacturers to supplant a technology by introducing an alternative one. A differential-equation system with delays is presented to describe the dynamics of an endogenous model with memory. Situations of competition in which the market has several manufacturers using the same technologies and are in competition are analyzed. Conditions for stability and existence of periodic oscilations by means of Hopf bifurcation is investigated.
Introduction
The sharing of the benefits generated by technological knowledge involves a variety of flows which govern actions of manufacturers and consumers of technological innovation. A number of business-cycle models postulating that both, internal factors in market as demand instability, resource avaliability or external ones, as instability of government policies, setbacks in environmental regulation, influence strongly the global dynamics of all producing activities (see [1, 2, [9] [10] [11] 13] ). Recently, technology planners and market agents have been interested in models that focus their attention on two causal variables, the one that captures the measure of the potential quantity of consumers in an economic system susceptible to adopt the new technology and another that captures the measure of quantity of a product with new technology (see [1, 2, 7, 10] ).
In [10] , the authors have adopted the transposition of techniques used in biomathematics to analyze the changes in migration of consumers facing new technologies (see also [3] ). In their model they considered external and internal socioeconomic factors but, they have assume that each firm takes only into account instantaneous information about both, its own technologic output and the one of their competitors. They show clear-cut results that describe the dynamics of the competition among manufacturers producing innovation technology. Huang, in [7] , investigates what is the impact that accurate information has on the features on the dynamics of an oligopolistic market and shows how an improvement in information accuracy (or elimination of delayed information) may destabilize an existing stable equilibrium.
Our purpose is contributing to understand the basic mechanisms involved in the complexity of competition and co-existence of new technologies in innovation technology process. We will see later which techniques from dynamical systems, the memory of the production process can contain to explanation the fluctuations in indicators of innovation process technology and ensure reliable assessment of possible impacts upon the socioeconomic factors that affect both demand and supply through innovation (see [2, 14] ).
Form the view point of many researchers, the production process of the market depends endogenously on its past history and in several researches, on mathematical modelling taking into account this problem (see [2, 5-7, 9, 11, 13] ).
The authors in [5] construct two linear continuous-time dynamic oligopoly models with partial adjustment towards the best response and analyse the effects on local stability caused by lagged information. The authors, in [6] , establish a class of economic models with two delays, one of them in production process and another in consumption. They discuss the stability of the equilibrium point for economic system and the existence of Hopf bifurcation. If the economy is in recession the government uses fiscal mechanisms or monetary policy and increases its expenditure to stimulate consumption and investment (pro-cyclical policy, see [12] ). Takeuchi and Yamamura, in [11] , investigate how the fiscal policy with a time delay affects stability in an economy. They assume that there exists a time delay between policy making to adjust the economy and its implementation which is divided into two factors: recognizing and decision making, which are lagged actions.
Having to control the uncertainty effect about adoption of new technology, individual manufacturer attempt to delay decision making until they receive more accurate information to minimize uncertainty and to ensure improvement in performance. So, in their decisions technology planners and market agents are always concerned about the existence of time delay between the moment when it is necessary to act and the moment of recognizing the necessity of action. We assume that they act consciously and that there are lags between the time that information are obtained and the time when decisions related to it are implemented.
We propose a similar model of endogenous competition as presented by the authors, in [10] . Let x(t) be the potential quantity of consumers within an economic system at instant t. Let us denote by y(t) the quantity of a product with new technology put on the market at instant t. We assume that the evolution rate of the quantity of consumers in an economic system susceptible to adopt the new technology increases with the function g and decreases with the sum p 0 and p 1 . The function p 0 represents the functional response rate of manufacturers with time delay incorporated. The function p 1 represents the instantaneous functional response rate of manufacturers. The function s + q( y) expresses the rate of specific extinction of the manufacturers due to intraspecific competition among them. The growth rate of the product with new technology depends on past history with p 0 and on the current moment at p 1 
where
, σ > 0, r > 0 and m ≥ 1 is the constant of mutual interference.
Assumption 1. Let be p(u)
The same way [10] , it follows from Assumption 1 that there are x 0 > 0 and y 0 > 0 so that
is the unique positive equilibrium point of (1), where
Assumption 2.
Let (x 0 , y 0 ) be the positive equilibrium point of the system (1). Le us assume that
Stability of competition among new technologies available close to P 0 was analysed in [10] . Since the model (1) depends on two delays, that leads to great complexity in the analysis of competition among new technologies available on the market (see [4] ). We observe that in this system the delays can not be eliminated by any change of variable. Its dynamics are studied in terms of the local stability of P 0 and of the Hopf bifurcation that is proven to exist as one of the delay crosses some critical value. To achieve our goals, we shall analyse how the roots of (3)) are distributed with respect to the imaginary axis. This is a classical problem that, in addition to being important by itself, plays an important role in the study of asymptotic behavior in the theory of delay differential equations (see [4] ).
If we set
that is the linearized system of (1), close to P 0 . From Assumption 2a it follows that κ 22 = 0.
Let λ = x + i y be a solution of equation (3). Separating real and imaginary parts in (3) we obtain the following equations system for x and y
The solutions of the system (4) with null real part are solutions of the system b y sin yσ + a cos y r = − y 2 + c
Suppose y = 0 is a solution of (5), then we must have
If we define u( y) = s + q( y), we indicate elasticity of u with respect to y at y 0 by ε q . Analogously, we have ε g , ε p 0 , ε p 1 and ε p are the elasticities of g, p 0 , p 1 and p at x 0 , respectively (see Assumption 1). [10] consider the system (1) with σ = r = 0, 0 < m ≤ 1 and the corresponding to configuration of the equilibrium P 0 is E3 (see [10, pp. 364 
Remark 1. Authors in

]). They indicate the diagonal elements of the variational matrix associated to E3 by H
We follow the alternative offered Bléair and Mackey, [2] which make it possible an endogenous explanation for erratic behaviour of competition with memory among new technologies available, when the innovation process operates around equilibrium point. The dynamics is described in terms of elasticities (see also [8] ). We also show that the dynamics of the model (1) depends, essentially, on delays and on elasticities of the rate of evolution of the consumers, on the functional response rate of manufacturers and on the rate of specific extinction of manufacturers owing to the intraspecific competition among then manufacturers.
From Assumption 2 it follows that
It also follows from Assumption 2 that,
So, we can check, directly, that equation (3) is equivalent to equation
Stability
For a moment assume that in (8) either 2 + 2ε g − ε p 1 = 0 and ε p 1 < −ε p 0 or −ε p 0 τ m g(x 0 ) > 0 and ε p 1 τ m g(x 0 ) < 0, so it is not true that all roots of the equation (9) have negative real part, once on the real axis H(0) = τ m [ε p 1 − (−ε p 0 )] < 0 and H(λ) → ∞ as λ → ∞, so, there will be unbounded solutions of (1) and we do not uniform ultimate boundedness. As can been seen, from certain combination of the elasticities with time delay, erratic changes can arise around their fundamental values, which causes instability in the complex system of competition among the new technologies available.
Remark 2. From
For a sake of simplicity, let be ρ 2 =:
Theorem 1. In addition to Assumption 1 and 2 we assume
the equilibrium point P 0 is locally asymptotically stable (d is defined in (8)).
Proof. Using (7), (8) (1), (9) all solutions has negative real part. It follows from Proposition 1 that the equilibrium point P 0 is locally asymptocally stable.
Theorem 1 gives sufficient conditions to ensure that the characteristic roots have negative real parts. This determines local stability of the equilibrium point for system (1) . Under such conditions, markets agents have to take into account that dependence on memory in production of innovation is harmless, as for as the economic system operates close enough to the equilibrium point and indicators of technological innovation process are stable. We have demonstrated how market planners and technology planners must search for information in the memory of the system economic to improve the accuracy of them actions and make them efficient to choose reliable strategies in order to achieve them goals.
Fluctuations
Nevertheless, once some parameters pass through critical values, Theorem 2 tells us that the system (1) loses stability and a Hopf Bifurcation will take place, that is, a family of periodic orbits bifurcates from the positive equilibrium point.
Theorem 2.
In addition to Assumption 1 and 2 we assume that
, then there are r * and y * satisfying
is a Hopf bifurcation point and close to P 0 , the system
Proof. With a simple computation we verify that
and n = 2τ m 4 3ε 5
. It follows from (13) that 0 ≤ m ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ n ≤ 1. We can choose 0 ≤ r * ≤ σ * satisfying 0 ≤ (σ * − r * ) y * ≤ σ * so that the straight line z = m y + n is tangent to the graphic of the function in (6) at the point ( y * , ( y * )). Since is a convex function on interval (0, ∞), then ( y) ≥ m y + n for all y ≥ 0. Analogously, we choose 0 ≤r ≤ σ * andȳ satisfying 0 ≤ (σ * −r)ȳ ≤ σ * so that the straight line z = m sin y + n sin is tangent to the graphic of the function sine defined in (6) at the point (ȳ, sin(σ * −r)ȳ). It is easy see that m sin = m sin (r,ȳ) = (σ * −r) cos(σ * −r)ȳ and n sin = n sin (r,ȳ) = sin(σ * −r)ȳ − (σ * −r)ȳ cos(σ * −r)ȳ.
Since r * and y * were chosen so that ( y * ) = m and ( y * ) = n , it follows from (5) and Implicit Function Theorem that the unique solution of the system
will be (r * , y * ).
By using implicit derivative in (3) we can show that
Because sin(σ * y * ) > [4( (8) 
Conclusions
With endogenous framework, the stabilization of competition on a market that operates with several manufacturers using same technologies, is accurately analyzed. It is clear from Theorems 1 and 2 that production delays in commodities markets are potentially destabilizing factors. Theorem 1 shows that planners can search for information in the memory of an economic system without doing harm to parameter systems governing technological innovation process. Theorem 2 shows that if parameters are close to the boundary of the stability region the system undergoes Hopf bifurcation. With this phenomenon the technological innovation process becomes unstable and fluctuating. This lead us to believe that our analysis of the model (1) is able to offer technology planners a reasonable explanation for cyclical behaviour in competitive markets, and it suggests how market agents must act to avoided fluctuations.
It is easy to see that x sin σ y − y cos σ y ≥ 0 for (x, y) ∈ S 2 . Moreover, for all (x, y) ∈ S 2 , we have Γ 2 (x, y) ≥ 2x y − d y + ae −r x sin r y > 0. Thus, there is no solution of (A3) that belongs to S 2 . Let consider (x, y) ∈ S 3 , then Γ 2 (x, y) ≥ 2x y −d y which is positive because d < 0. Hence, there is no solution of (A3) that belongs to S 3 .
For each (x, y) ∈ S 4 , we define ζ 2 (x, y) = (x y) −1 [x sin yσ − y cos yσ]. we can check directly that yζ 2 (x, y) ≥ −2 and y sin y r ≥ −x. Then,
which is positive if y ≥x (see A1), whence (A5) has no solution at S 4 .
Let (x, y) ∈ S 5 . Because xζ 2 (x, y) ≥ −2 and (x y) (1)). Hence, there is no solution of (A3) that belongs to S 6 .
Finally, the system (4) has no purely imaginary solution. If the roots of the system (4) with null real part exist, they must be roots of the system (5) We suppose y = 0 is a solution of (5), then we must have sin(σ y − r y) = ( y) (see (6) 
